Solidifying and landfilling waste asbestos that is already solidified and not at risk of scattering pursuant to Subitem (b)(1) of Item 2) of Subparagraph 4(c) of Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 does not constitute an act of treating waste in violation of Article 13 of the Wastes Control Act.

First, Subitem (b) of Item 2) of Subparagraph 4(c) of Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 merely stipulates packing in bags and landfilling in designated waste landfill facilities as the standards and methods for treating waste asbestos that is solidified and not at risk of scattering, and does not prohibit solidification treatment, which is the treatment standard and method applied to waste asbestos in the form of dust or debris. Thus, applying the stricter treatment standards and methods designated for dust or debris forms to solidify waste asbestos that is already solidified and not at risk of scattering cannot be viewed as a violation of statutes.

Furthermore, since the treatment standards in Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 should be viewed as setting minimum standards for environmental preservation, taking stricter measures than these should be deemed permissible. Waste asbestos poses high human toxicity even among designated wastes, and even if visually solidified, there may be a risk of scattering due to damage or breakage during transport. Therefore, selecting solidification treatment instead of the bag packaging method, even for waste asbestos that is solidified and not at risk of scattering, can be regarded as an appropriate management action to reduce the hazards of waste and enhance environmental safety.

In addition, this aligns with the legislative purpose of the Wastes Control Act (Article 1) to contribute to environmental preservation and the improvement of the quality of public life by treating waste in an eco-friendly manner, as well as the basic principles of waste management under Article 3-2 of the same Act, which stipulate that when discharging waste, appropriate measures must be taken in advance so as not to cause harm to the surrounding environment or residents' health (Paragraph 2), and waste must be properly treated to reduce its volume and toxicity during the treatment process (Paragraph 3).

Moreover, examining the legislative history of Attached Table 1 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 amended by Presidential Decree No. 20478 on December 28, 2007, asbestos that was solidified and not at risk of scattering was previously excluded from designated waste. However, because it contains substances harmful to the human body just like general asbestos, it was reclassified as designated waste to be managed strictly.¹⁾ Choosing a stricter treatment standard and method than bag packaging during the waste asbestos treatment process aims to prevent harm more strictly within the designated waste management system, and it is necessary to consider that this conforms to the intent of the aforementioned amendment when interpreting this case.

Therefore, solidifying and landfilling waste asbestos that is already solidified and not at risk of scattering pursuant to Subitem (b)(1) of Item 2) of Subparagraph 4(c) of Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 does not constitute an act of treating waste in violation of Article 13 of the Wastes Control Act.

In this case, import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs cannot be deemed a violation of the Mother and Child Health Act.

First, Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 stipulates that a physician may perform artificial pregnancy termination surgery under certain grounds, and Article 2, Item 7 of the same Act defines only 'artificial pregnancy termination surgery' which artificially discharges the fetus and its appendages outside the mother's body. Textually, the subject of regulation under the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 is limited to a physician's 'surgery', and it contains no provisions regarding the permission or prohibition of pregnancy termination drugs or their import item approval.

However, for an administrative disposition to be deemed in 'violation' of a specific law, the disposition must fall under the scope of regulation governed by prohibition or order provisions in that law and constitute a breach thereof. Import item approval for pharmaceuticals is an administrative disposition granted by the Minister of Food and Drug Safety regarding 'pharmaceuticals' pursuant to the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. It does not fall under 'a physician's surgical act' under Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 in the first place, nor is there any room for it to fall under other statutory prohibitions under the same Act. Thus, it is not a subject of regulation under the 「Mother and Child Health Act」, and import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs cannot be deemed a violation of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

Furthermore, import item approval under Article 42 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act is a statutory procedure under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act that reviews the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals to permit their market distribution via import. In contrast, Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 is a provision establishing the permissible limits of artificial pregnancy termination surgery; the two differ in regulatory purpose and subject. Import item approval for pharmaceuticals is merely a disposition authorizing the import and distribution of the relevant pharmaceutical, not a disposition that determines the legality of, directs, or orders a specific method of pregnancy termination. Therefore, the mere circumstance that the import of a pharmaceutical has been approved cannot lead to the conclusion that the disposition violated Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

In addition, Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 has merely functioned as a standard for exemption from punishment for abortion by excluding the application of abortion crimes under the Criminal Act pursuant to Article 28 of the same Act. It is difficult to view the provision itself as an independent prohibitive norm that actively bans 'pregnancy termination by methods other than surgery'. Moreover, since Article 269, Paragraph 1 (Self-Abortion) and Article 270, Paragraph 1 (Physician Abortion) of the Criminal Act—which fundamentally prohibited and punished pregnancy termination—were ruled Non-conformable to the Constitution on April 11,²⁾2019 and lost their effect on January 1, 2021, deriving an independent prohibitive effect that 'pregnancy termination outside the methods and grounds specified in the relevant law is prohibited' by a converse interpretation of the permissible grounds in Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 does not conform to the normative system. Furthermore, it creates a burdensome restriction without explicit statutory basis, which runs counter to the intent of the aforementioned Constitutional Non-conformity decision and is thus difficult to permit.

In addition, the purpose of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 is to contribute to the improvement of public health by protecting the life and health of mothers and infants (Article 1). If import item approval were prohibited even for pharmaceuticals whose safety and efficacy have been confirmed, rendering them unavailable to the general public, it would rather conflict with the legislative purpose of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 to protect the right to life and health of mothers. The main intent of the Constitutional Non-conformity decision regarding Article 269, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act, etc., lies in the principle that a woman's right to self-determination regarding whether to maintain pregnancy must not be excessively restricted, and the protection of fetal life must be harmoniously balanced with a woman's right to self-determination. In light of this intent, it is also necessary to consider when interpreting this case that if it is a pregnancy termination drug whose safety and efficacy have been confirmed, the import item approval itself should not be prohibited as a violation of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

On the other hand, there is an opinion that since the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 stipulates only surgery, other methods such as drugs are prohibited and their import item approval is also impermissible. However, Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 has existed since its enactment in 1973 and merely failed to reflect subsequent medical advancements and the diversification of pregnancy termination means; an intent to actively prohibit pregnancy termination drugs or their import item approval cannot be derived therefrom. In particular, under the current legal system where major parts of abortion crimes under the Criminal Act have lost their effect, it is also difficult to establish the normative premise to interpret Articles 14 and 28 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 as grounds for prohibiting methods other than surgery.

Furthermore, there may be an opinion that import item approval cannot be granted for pregnancy termination drugs under the current state where Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 remains in force while proposed amendments to the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 aimed at reorganizing provisions on artificial pregnancy termination (Footnote: Refer to the main contents of the Partial Amendment to the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 submitted by the government on Nov 18, 2020 under Bill No. 2105459) failed to be enacted into law. However, putting aside the point that the regulatory system regarding permissible gestational weeks, grounds, and procedures for pregnancy termination needs to be clearly reorganized through legislation, using current Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 as a ground to prohibit import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs itself simply because such legislative measures remain incomplete is not valid.

Therefore, in this case, import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs cannot be deemed a violation of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

In this case, the employer personally can serve as the safety and health manager.

First, Article 15(1) of the Act stipulates that an employer shall require a person who substantially oversees and manages a place of business to oversee and manage matters concerning safety and health at the place of business under each item of the same paragraph. Article 15(2) defines the person who oversees and manages the tasks specified in each item of Article 15(1) as the safety and health manager, requiring them to direct and supervise safety managers under Article 17 and health managers under Article 18.

However, Article 15(1) of the Act sets the qualification for a safety and health manager based solely on whether the person holds substantive authority to oversee and manage the place of business. It does not prohibit the employer from serving as the safety and health manager, nor does it mandate that a person other than the employer must be appointed. Therefore, when an employer directly oversees and manages a place of business, it is consistent with the statutory text for the employer personally to serve as the safety and health manager.

Furthermore, if the law were interpreted to require appointing someone other than the employer as the safety and health manager even when the employer directly oversees and manages the place of business, it would result in formally granting the status of safety and health manager to a person without actual authority over workplace safety and health matters. This would run counter to the purpose of the Act (Article 1), which aims to establish a safety and health management system centered on the person with substantive authority and responsibility to direct and supervise safety and health, while clarifying where responsibility lies.

In addition, a administrative fine is imposed for violations of Article 15(1) of the Act (Article 175(5)(1)). Interpreting that an employer cannot serve as the safety and health manager simply because the entity obligated to appoint one is the employer—even when that employer directly oversees and manages the place of business—overly expands provisions that serve as the basis for burdensome administrative measures in a manner unfavorable to the employer, which is unreasonable.

On the other hand, there is an opinion that an employer cannot serve as a safety and health manager because the employer and the safety and health manager are distinct legal entities. However, the safety and health manager system is not intended to formally confer a specific position, but to ensure that the person possessing substantive authority and responsibility to oversee and manage workplace safety and health performs that role. Considering that, unlike "safety managers" or "health managers" under Articles 17 and 18 of the Act, safety and health managers are not required to perform their duties on an exclusive basis, and that an employer who directly manages a place of business can make swift decisions and execute matters regarding costs, personnel, and facility improvements for safety and health while clarifying accountability, such an opinion is not sound.

Therefore, in this case, the employer personally can serve as the safety and health manager.

Factories, etc. exempt from installing sprinkler systems refer only to cases where both the roofs and exterior walls are made of non-combustible materials and both possess a fire-resistant structure.

First, Item 1(d) of Attached Table 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Fire Facility Act designates specific fire safety objects required to install sprinkler systems, and sub-item 10) specifies factories, etc. whose “roofs or exterior walls are not made of non-combustible materials or do not have a fire-resistant structure.” In terms of textual context, the word “or” between “roofs” and “exterior walls” signifies an alternative connection. Therefore, if either the roof or exterior wall meets the subsequent conditions, it should be considered subject to application. Similarly, the phrasing “are not made of non-combustible materials or do not have a fire-resistant structure” means that if either condition—being non-combustible or being fire-resistant—is not met, it is appropriate to consider the facility subject to the requirement.

Accordingly, if either the roof or exterior wall is not made of non-combustible materials, or if either the roof or exterior wall does not possess a fire-resistant structure, the facility must be regarded as subject to sprinkler system installation. By reverse interpretation, it conforms to the clear language of the text to conclude that only factories, etc. whose roofs and exterior walls are both made of non-combustible materials and simultaneously possess a fire-resistant structure are exempt from sprinkler system installation.

Furthermore, when the Enforcement Decree of the Fire Facility Act was partially amended by Presidential Decree No. 25444 on July 7, 2014, the standards were tightened to require sprinkler systems if the roofs or exterior walls of factories, etc. were not made of non-combustible materials or lacked a fire-resistant structure. This amendment aimed to resolve the issue of rapid fire spread and severe damage caused when roofs or exterior walls are not non-combustible or fire-resistant. Therefore, concluding that only factories, etc. whose roofs and exterior walls are both made of non-combustible materials and have a fire-resistant structure are exempt aligns with the legislative intent of the Decree.

In addition, considering the purpose of the Fire Facility Act (Article 1)—which aims to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of citizens and contribute to public safety and welfare—and the fact that the installation of fire-extinguishing equipment directly relates to protecting public safety and must be strictly interpreted, it is reasonable to hold that factories, etc. must be equipped with sprinkler systems if either the roof or exterior wall is not made of non-combustible materials (which do not burn easily during a fire) or does not possess a fire-resistant structure (which can withstand fire).

Therefore, factories, etc. exempt from installing sprinkler systems refer only to cases where both the roofs and exterior walls are made of non-combustible materials and both possess a fire-resistant structure.

In this Case, the retirement pay must be calculated by using ordinary wages as average wages pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act.

First, Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act stipulates the method of calculating average wages (Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1), while prescribing that if the amount calculated pursuant to Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 of the same Article is less than the ordinary wages of the relevant employee, such amount of ordinary wages shall be deemed his or her average wages (Paragraph 2). As such, Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the same Act is not a separate, independent provision but a provision that complements the concept of average wages in an inseparable relationship with Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 of the same Article. When calculating average wages, Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 of the same Article shall apply in principle, but if the calculated amount falls below ordinary wages, Paragraph 2 of the same Article shall apply, making the amount of ordinary wages the final average wages.

Therefore, unless the Retirement Benefit Act contains a separate provision excluding the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act, when calculating an employee's retirement pay pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Retirement Benefit Act, if the employee's average wages are less than his or her ordinary wages, the retirement pay must similarly be calculated by using the amount of ordinary wages as average wages pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act.

Furthermore, ordinary wages serve as the 'standard wage' for calculating various statutory allowances such as allowance for extended, night, and holiday work (Article 56), advance notice of dismissal allowance (Article 26), and annual paid leave allowance (Article 60) under the Labor Standards Act, functioning to guarantee the minimum level of average wages, which may fluctuate depending on actual working hours or work performance³⁾. Meanwhile, the purpose of the retirement pay system is to guarantee an employee's normal standard of living as before⁴⁾. If the average wages forming the basis for calculating retirement pay fail to reach even ordinary wages—the basis for calculating various statutory allowances—interpreting the law to allow adjustment so that retirement pay is calculated and paid based on ordinary wages aligns with the purpose of establishing the ordinary wage and retirement pay systems.

In addition, the Labor Standards Act aims to guarantee and improve the basic living standards of employees by setting standards for working conditions in accordance with the Constitution (Article 1), and the Retirement Benefit Act aims to contribute to guaranteeing a stable post-retirement life for employees by prescribing matters necessary for establishing and operating employee retirement benefit systems (Article 1). In light of the legislative purposes of these two statutes, receiving retirement pay less than the amount calculated on the basis of ordinary wages for an employee who provided contractual work does not accord with the legislative purpose of guaranteeing employees' basic living standards and stable post-retirement lives, which must also be considered when interpreting this Case.

Therefore, in this Case, the retirement pay must be calculated by using ordinary wages as average wages pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act.

In this Case, the consent of all co-owners for the land use must be obtained.

Article 57 (1) of the National Land Planning Act and Article 9 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act merely stipulate that to apply for a permit for development activities, one must submit "documents proving that the applicant is entitled to engage in development activities on the relevant land, such as ownership or right to use the land," to the authority granting permits for development activities, but do not provide whether consent of all co-owners or merely a majority of co-owners is required for land use when applying for a permit for development activities regarding co-owned land. Therefore, this Case shall follow the Civil Act, which is the general law regarding the management, disposition, and alteration of co-owned property.

However, Article 262 (1) of the Civil Act stipulates that when a thing is owned by several persons by shares, it shall belong to joint ownership (co-ownership), and Article 264 of the same Act stipulates that no co-owner may dispose of or alter the co-owned property without the consent of the other co-owners. Furthermore, the main sentence of Article 265 of the same Act stipulates that matters concerning the management of co-owned property shall be decided by a majority of shares of the co-owners. In this Case, the issue is whether the alteration of the form and quality of land intended for constructing a new building on co-owned land constitutes a disposition or alteration of co-owned property, or an act of management of co-owned property.

First, Article 9 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the National Land Planning Act requires a person who intends to engage in development activities to submit documents proving that the applicant is entitled to engage in development activities on the land, such as ownership or right to use the land, when applying for a permit for development activities. This is understood to mean that the applicant must submit documents to confirm whether they have secured a legal title to stably and lawfully carry out the planned development activities on the land¹⁾.

However, the alteration of the form and quality of land that requires a permit for development activities pursuant to Article 56 (1) 2 of the National Land Planning Act refers to construction work that changes the shape of the land into a building lot suitable for the new construction of a building²⁾. By altering the shape of the land through methods such as cutting, filling, leveling, or paving, it externally and effectively alters the form and quality of the land, placing it in a state that is difficult to restore to its original state³⁾. This goes beyond acts of management of co-owned property—such as determining specific methods for using and taking the profits from the co-owned property—and constitutes an act of 'disposition' or 'alteration' that causes a fundamental change to the existing state of the co-owned property⁴⁾. Therefore, in this Case, it must be deemed that the consent of all co-owners regarding the use of co-owned land is required.

Furthermore, Article 11 (11) 2 of the Building Act explicitly provides a special exception allowing a building permit to be granted without securing full ownership if consent is obtained from at least 80 percent of the co-owners of the co-owned building and land, and the sum of the shares of the consenting co-owners constitutes at least 80 percent of the total shares. On the other hand, considering that the National Land Planning Act and its subordinate statutes do not contain separate provisions regarding the ratio of co-owners whose consent must be obtained when applying for a permit for development activities on co-owned land, it is reasonable in this Case to strictly apply the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Act and interpret that the consent of all co-owners for land use is necessary.

In addition, if a permit for development activities is granted with the consent of only a portion of the co-owners, the possibility of legal disputes arising among the non-consenting co-owners after the permit is issued cannot be ruled out. Thus, to ensure the effectiveness and stability of administration, the need to strictly interpret the consent requirements for the use of co-owned land must also be considered when interpreting this Case.

Therefore, in this Case, the consent of all co-owners for the land use must be obtained.

The facilities allowed to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act include all facilities except for those specified in each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

First, Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act defines one of the facilities permitted to enter a knowledge industry center as "other facilities prescribed by Presidential Decree as facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies." The main text of the parts outside the individual subparagraphs of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, which is delegated by the statute, explicitly states that "facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Act shall be facilities excluding the facilities listed in the following subparagraphs." Therefore, under the literal text and regulatory structure of the Industrial Cluster Act and its decree, it is clear that any facility is deemed a facility for supporting the production activities of tenant companies as long as it is not excluded by the subparagraphs of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree. Since the regulation does not require a separate uation of whether a facility possesses the functional capacity to support the production activities of tenant companies, all facilities—excluding those listed in each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the same Decree—must be viewed as "facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies allowed to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Act."¹⁾

Generally, when a statute utilizes a delegation clause formatted as "...as facilities prescribed by Presidential Decree," it is intended to enable the upper statute to predict what contents will be determined by the lower decree.²⁾ When defining delegated matters in this manner within a lower decree, the provisions must satisfy the criteria of "...as facilities."³⁾ Consequently, facilities that are not excluded by each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Cluster Act should be considered to already satisfy the criteria for "facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies."⁴⁾

Furthermore, the former Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Cluster Act (prior to being amended by other laws under Presidential Decree No. 33366 on March 28, 2023, and enforced on the same day) used to exhaustively list the individual facilities intended to support the production activities of tenant companies in Article 36-4, Paragraph 2. However, through the amendment by other laws via Presidential Decree No. 33366 on March 28, 2023, the regulatory method was altered to list only the facilities prohibited from entering knowledge industry centers. This shift was intended to revitalize knowledge industry centers and enhance convenience for tenant companies by allowing most facilities to enter, with the exception of a few sectors such as agriculture, gambling, and housing supply businesses.⁵⁾ Therefore, when determining whether a facility is permitted to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act, interpreting the law to require an independent assessment of whether it supports production activities—in addition to verifying whether it is excluded by the subparagraphs of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree—would tighten regulations on eligible facilities without any special legal basis. This does not align with the purpose of the Industrial Cluster Act and its decree, which aims to expand the scope of eligible tenant companies.

Therefore, the facilities allowed to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act include all facilities except for those specified in each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

The scope of power generation projects subject to the consultation procedure pursuant to Article 7, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 5 of the "Electricity Utility Act" is limited to the projects specified in each subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

First, Article 7, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 5 of the "Electricity Utility Act" mandates that for power generation businesses using solar, wind, or fuel cell energy under Article 2 of the Renewable Energy Act, "a public consultation procedure shall be conducted through prior notice as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Rather than directly prescribing the applicable scope and methods of the public consultation procedure, it delegates them to the Presidential Decree. This is intended to allow the Presidential Decree to specifically determine the targets and procedures requiring public consultation in consideration of practical suitability based on the type and scale of the power generation business. Therefore, if each subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" exhaustively lists the types, scope, and announcement deadlines of the projects, it is consistent with the literal text to interpret this as imposing the obligation of public consultation only on the relevant projects.

In particular, Article 4-2, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 2, Item (c) of the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" sets the announcement deadline for fuel cell power generation businesses under Article 2, Subparagraph 1, Item (b) of the Renewable Energy Act, while strictly limiting its scope only to power generation businesses with a generation capacity "exceeding 3,000 kilowatts." Selecting and regulating only cases that exceed a specific capacity based on generation capacity should be viewed as reflecting the legislative intent to allow projects falling short of that capacity to omit the public consultation procedure.

Furthermore, since the public consultation procedure has a regulatory nature that imposes a temporal and financial burden on those seeking a license for a power generation business, expanding the interpretation to apply the consultation procedure regulations even to projects that do not fall under any subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" is difficult to permit under the principle of the rule of law in administration. It is also unreasonable in that it could cause difficulties in project progression for operators due to unclear text regarding the timing and method of announcements.

In addition, looking at the legislative history of the regulations regarding public consultation on power generation businesses, when the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" was partially amended by Presidential Decree No. 31066 on September 20, 2020, the scope of projects subject to public consultation was limited to 'projects above a certain level,' such as projects subject to environmental impact assessments, considering the degree of impact on residents' lives or the environment. It is necessary to consider when interpreting this case that the regulation was established with the intent not to apply the public consultation procedure to small-scale power generation businesses that do not fall into this category.¹⁾.

Therefore, the scope of power generation projects subject to the consultation procedure pursuant to Article 7, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 5 of the "Electricity Utility Act" is limited to the projects specified in each subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

An Owner, etc. of a building with multiple tenants that generates 300 kilograms or more of waste on a daily average does not qualify as a business waste generator required to report under Article 17 (2) of the Wastes Control Act.

First, Article 2 (3) of the Wastes Control Act defines "business waste" as waste generated at a business site that installs and operates emission facilities under the Clean Air Conservation Act, etc. Article 17 (1) stipulates the obligations of business operators who generate business waste, and Paragraph 2 stipulates the reporting of the type and volume of such waste. The waste management laws and regulations apply regulations related to business waste based on the individual business entity that "generates" the waste.

Generally, a "business operator" refers to a person who manages a business at a business site2), and a "business waste generator" refers to a person who emits waste generated at their own business site as a result of their business activities3). The Owner, etc. of a building who leases space to individual business operators merely provides the premises; they do not engage in the actual business activities that serve as the root cause of waste generation. Therefore, unless there is an explicit provision in the waste management laws requiring the Owner, etc. to process waste "jointly" or "collectively," it is difficult to view the Owner, etc. as a business waste generator subject to the reporting requirement under Article 17 (2).

Furthermore, the Wastes Control Act distinguishes between "business waste" (Article 2 (3)) and "municipal waste" (Article 2 (2)), which is waste other than business waste. While municipal waste is subject to disposal obligations imposed on the Mayor of a Special Self-Governing City, etc. (Article 14 (1)), business waste requires the generating business operator to fulfill obligations such as verifying whether the waste is designated waste (Article 17 (1) 1) and ensuring treatment in compliance with disposal standards and methods (Article 17 (1) 1-2). Business operators are required to treat the waste themselves or entrust it to a licensed waste treatment operator (Article 18 (1)). Thus, the subjects and methods of treatment vary depending on the type of waste.

In cases where a single building hosts multiple tenants, the subject and method of treatment may differ depending on the type of waste generated by each individual business. Therefore, aggregating the waste generated by individual tenants merely because they occupy the same building to impose a reporting obligation on the Owner, etc. under Article 17 (2) does not align with the systemic structure of the waste management regulations.

In addition, the "Report Form for Business Waste Generator" (Form No. 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act) requires the reporter to provide "Trade Name" and "Business Registration Number," and to specify information such as "Industry Type," "Main Raw Materials and Consumption," "Main Products and Production Volume," and "Manufacturing Process" in the current status section. It also requires a plan for the discharge and treatment of business waste. This indicates that the report requires details regarding the nature of the business—such as production and manufacturing processes—which supports the interpretation that the entity actually operating the business is the intended party to be classified as the business waste generator.

Lastly, administrative regulations that serve as the basis for punitive administrative actions must be interpreted and applied strictly, and should not be extended or applied by analogy to the detriment of the counterparty4). Since Article 68 (1) 1-4 of the Wastes Control Act prescribes administrative fines for those who fail to report or provide false reports in violation of Article 17 (2), interpreting the law to mandate that an Owner, etc. of a building generating 300kg or more of waste daily must report is an expansion of the scope of regulation and punitive targets without explicit legal basis or reasonable grounds. This factor must also be considered in interpreting this matter.

Therefore, an Owner, etc. of a building with multiple tenants that generates 300 kilograms or more of waste on a daily average does not qualify as a business waste generator required to report under Article 17 (2) of the Wastes Control Act.

In this case, the hearing process for residents, businesses, and experts under Article 7 of the Regional Special Zones Act cannot be omitted pursuant to the proviso of Article 16, Paragraph 1 of the same Act.

First, Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the Regional Special Zones Act stipulates that the approval of a "Specialized Zone Plan" is deemed granted upon the designation and public notice of a Specialized Zone. Articles 62 and 63 of the Act require the inclusion of a "Specialized Zone Land Use Plan"—which encompasses plans for the designation and modification of zoning districts—within the Specialized Zone Plan if effective land use is required. Furthermore, Article 64, Paragraph 1 provides that upon approval of a Specialized Zone Plan containing such a land use plan, the decision on urban/county management plans under the "National Land Planning and Utilization Act" is deemed to have been made. Consequently, the designation of a Specialized Zone results in the application of building restrictions and other regulations⁴⁾ within the designated zones.

In other words, while the designation of a Specialized Zone grants regulatory exceptions to the project operator, it also imposes significant and direct restrictions on the property rights of local residents within the zone, such as limitations on the use and scale of land and buildings. Even if the amendment to the Specialized Zone Plan is limited to extending the designation period, this not only signifies an extension of the zone's duration but also extends the effective period of the applied regulatory exceptions. This effectively forces residents to remain under a new legal status or maintains existing property right restrictions for the extended period, thereby directly affecting their interests.

Therefore, in this case, the amendment to the Specialized Zone Plan must be considered to include the regulatory exceptions under Articles 62 through 65 of the Regional Special Zones Act. It is difficult to conclude that this situation qualifies for the omission of the hearing process under the proviso of Article 16, Paragraph 1.

The proviso of Article 16, Paragraph 1 was enacted to facilitate the efficient implementation of projects by allowing for the omission of public hearings only when the amendments do not restrict the property rights of local residents or do not involve land use regulatory exceptions under the Act⁵⁾. Interpreting this provision to allow the omission of hearings when an extension of the designation period effectively extends the duration of regulatory exceptions under Articles 62 through 65 would contradict the legislative intent of Article 16, Paragraph 1, which strictly limits the exception to cases where the interests of residents are not impacted.

Accordingly, the process for hearing the opinions of residents, businesses, and experts cannot be omitted in this case.