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In this case, the value of the land must be included in the “value of the facilities received” under the main text of Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Public Property Act.

First, Article 3-2(2) of the Public Property Act provides that “acquisitions and disposals shall be balanced” as a principle that local governments must observe when managing and disposing of public property. Accordingly, the main text of Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act should be regarded as a provision that specifies, in line with the principle of balance set forth in the Act, that the scope of a donation for transfer shall be based on the “value of the facilities received.”

In addition, Article 7(2)2 of the Public Property Act provides that, where the use of administrative property is abolished, a person who provides alternative facilities to be used for that purpose may donate such facilities on the condition that the person receives a transfer of the property whose use has been abolished “within the scope of the costs borne.” This can be seen as requiring that the scope of a donation for transfer be determined based on the “costs incurred in providing the alternative facilities.”

In light of the wording and structure of the Public Property Act, it is not reasonable to interpret that, because the proviso to Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree, a subordinate statute, provides that “land shall be calculated by area,” the value-based standard under the main text of the same paragraph must be excluded for land and the scope of a donation for transfer must be calculated based solely on area.

Furthermore, the Public Property Act aims to properly protect public property and to manage and dispose of it efficiently (Article 1). In particular, considering that public property subject to a donation for transfer is administrative property directly used for the administrative purposes of a local government until its use is abolished, and therefore carries a high degree of public character and public interest²⁾, interpreting the “value of the facilities received” under the main text of Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree, which is used to calculate the scope of a donation for transfer, as including the value of the land is consistent with the purpose and intent of the Public Property Act.

Meanwhile, there is an opinion that, because the value set forth as the scope of a donation for transfer in the main text of Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree is the value of “facilities,” only the area-based standard under the proviso to the same paragraph should apply to “land.”

그However, such an opinion is not reasonable, considering the following: as examined above, the proviso to Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree needs to be interpreted harmoniously in a manner consistent with Articles 3-2(2) and 7(2)2 of the Public Property Act, which set forth the principle of balance; where the property subject to a donation for transfer takes the form of land combined with structures, the land on which the structures are fixed is essential for the structures to function for their original purpose, so the land and the structures are inseparable, and the “value of the facilities received” under the main text of the same paragraph should therefore be regarded as including the value of the land combined with the structures; and although land values can vary widely depending on location, if area alone were used as the standard, a person providing alternative facilities could provide land of significantly lower value, thereby causing property losses to the local government and undermining the legislative purpose of the Public Property Act, namely the protection of public property.

Therefore, in this case, the value of the land must be included in the “value of the facilities received” under the main text of Article 46(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Public Property Act.

In this case, it does not constitute a case partitioned by a wall of fire-resistant construction.

First, Article 15 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Firefighting Systems Act stipulates "where the existing portion and the extended portion are partitioned by floors and walls of fire-resistant construction" as a case in which the firefighting system standards in force at the time of extension may not be applied to the existing portion when a specific fire-fighting object is extended.

Here, "wall of fire-resistant construction" refers to a wall possessing the performance capability to withstand fire and meeting the standards for fire-resistant construction under relevant statutes³⁾, while "partition" means dividing a certain space by establishing a boundary⁴⁾. Considering the legislative intent of the said provision—which seeks to recognize an exception for the existing portion when it is partitioned so as to prevent the spread of fire between the existing portion and the extended portion—"partition" herein must be construed as separating spaces in a manner enabling the wall of fire-resistant construction to function to prevent the spread of fire.

Accordingly, as in this case, even if the wall structure itself meets the standards for fire-resistant construction, if there is a window or doorway in that wall such that the existing portion and the extended portion are not blocked off from each other, heat and smoke can travel through that opening; therefore, it is difficult to regard the space as being "partitioned" by a wall of fire-resistant construction.

Furthermore, Article 15 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Firefighting Systems Act separately prescribes as subjects eligible for the exception "where the existing portion and the extended portion are partitioned by floors and walls of fire-resistant construction" (subparagraph 1) and "where the existing portion and the extended portion are partitioned by structures such as automatic fire shutters or 60-minute+ fire doors" (subparagraph 2). Among these, automatic fire shutters and 60-minute+ fire doors under subparagraph 2 are, by their nature, fire-prevention equipment installed in wall openings, making cases where the existing portion and the extended portion are partitioned by installing such equipment in openings eligible for the exception.

However, if the "case partitioned by a wall of fire-resistant construction" under Article 15 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Firefighting Systems Act were interpreted to include cases like the present one—where there is an opening without fire-prevention equipment such as automatic fire shutters installed—such cases would receive the exact same exception as cases where fire-prevention equipment is installed in the opening pursuant to subparagraph 2 of the same paragraph. This is inconsistent with the regulatory structure that prescribes partitioning requirements under subparagraph 2 separately from subparagraph 1 of the same paragraph.

In addition, when a statute establishes a provision regarding a general principle and then sets forth an exception to that principle, the meaning of the text must not be expanded without reasonable grounds when interpreting such an exception, and it must be strictly construed⁵⁾. The proviso to Article 15 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Firefighting Systems Act constitutes an exception to the principle that the firefighting system standards in force at the time of extension must apply to the entirety of a specific fire-fighting object, including the existing portion, upon extension. Therefore, viewing cases where an opening exists between the existing portion and the extended portion—as in this case—as falling within the scope of application constitutes an overly broad interpretation of an exceptional provision and is thus improper.

Furthermore, since the Installation and Management of Firefighting Systems Act aims to protect the lives, bodies, and property of citizens and to contribute to the promotion of public safety and welfare (Article 1), regulations on the safety and fire prevention of buildings must be interpreted in a manner that faithfully realizes such purposes⁶⁾. Accordingly, it must also be considered that, where there is an opening between the existing portion and the extended portion as in this case and no automatic fire shutter or fire door is installed in that opening, the existing portion and the extended portion cannot be protected from heat, smoke, and the like caused by a fire. Applying the exception by treating such a case as one partitioned by a wall of fire-resistant construction therefore does not conform to this legislative purpose.

Therefore, in this case, it does not constitute a case partitioned by a wall of fire-resistant construction.

Solidifying and landfilling waste asbestos that is already solidified and not at risk of scattering pursuant to Subitem (b)(1) of Item 2) of Subparagraph 4(c) of Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 does not constitute an act of treating waste in violation of Article 13 of the Wastes Control Act.

First, Subitem (b) of Item 2) of Subparagraph 4(c) of Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 merely stipulates packing in bags and landfilling in designated waste landfill facilities as the standards and methods for treating waste asbestos that is solidified and not at risk of scattering, and does not prohibit solidification treatment, which is the treatment standard and method applied to waste asbestos in the form of dust or debris. Thus, applying the stricter treatment standards and methods designated for dust or debris forms to solidify waste asbestos that is already solidified and not at risk of scattering cannot be viewed as a violation of statutes.

Furthermore, since the treatment standards in Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 should be viewed as setting minimum standards for environmental preservation, taking stricter measures than these should be deemed permissible. Waste asbestos poses high human toxicity even among designated wastes, and even if visually solidified, there may be a risk of scattering due to damage or breakage during transport. Therefore, selecting solidification treatment instead of the bag packaging method, even for waste asbestos that is solidified and not at risk of scattering, can be regarded as an appropriate management action to reduce the hazards of waste and enhance environmental safety.

In addition, this aligns with the legislative purpose of the Wastes Control Act (Article 1) to contribute to environmental preservation and the improvement of the quality of public life by treating waste in an eco-friendly manner, as well as the basic principles of waste management under Article 3-2 of the same Act, which stipulate that when discharging waste, appropriate measures must be taken in advance so as not to cause harm to the surrounding environment or residents' health (Paragraph 2), and waste must be properly treated to reduce its volume and toxicity during the treatment process (Paragraph 3).

Moreover, examining the legislative history of Attached Table 1 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 amended by Presidential Decree No. 20478 on December 28, 2007, asbestos that was solidified and not at risk of scattering was previously excluded from designated waste. However, because it contains substances harmful to the human body just like general asbestos, it was reclassified as designated waste to be managed strictly.¹⁾ Choosing a stricter treatment standard and method than bag packaging during the waste asbestos treatment process aims to prevent harm more strictly within the designated waste management system, and it is necessary to consider that this conforms to the intent of the aforementioned amendment when interpreting this case.

Therefore, solidifying and landfilling waste asbestos that is already solidified and not at risk of scattering pursuant to Subitem (b)(1) of Item 2) of Subparagraph 4(c) of Attached Table 5 of the 「Enforcement Rule of the Wastes Control Act」 does not constitute an act of treating waste in violation of Article 13 of the Wastes Control Act.

In this case, import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs cannot be deemed a violation of the Mother and Child Health Act.

First, Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 stipulates that a physician may perform artificial pregnancy termination surgery under certain grounds, and Article 2, Item 7 of the same Act defines only 'artificial pregnancy termination surgery' which artificially discharges the fetus and its appendages outside the mother's body. Textually, the subject of regulation under the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 is limited to a physician's 'surgery', and it contains no provisions regarding the permission or prohibition of pregnancy termination drugs or their import item approval.

However, for an administrative disposition to be deemed in 'violation' of a specific law, the disposition must fall under the scope of regulation governed by prohibition or order provisions in that law and constitute a breach thereof. Import item approval for pharmaceuticals is an administrative disposition granted by the Minister of Food and Drug Safety regarding 'pharmaceuticals' pursuant to the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. It does not fall under 'a physician's surgical act' under Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 in the first place, nor is there any room for it to fall under other statutory prohibitions under the same Act. Thus, it is not a subject of regulation under the 「Mother and Child Health Act」, and import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs cannot be deemed a violation of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

Furthermore, import item approval under Article 42 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act is a statutory procedure under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act that reviews the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals to permit their market distribution via import. In contrast, Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 is a provision establishing the permissible limits of artificial pregnancy termination surgery; the two differ in regulatory purpose and subject. Import item approval for pharmaceuticals is merely a disposition authorizing the import and distribution of the relevant pharmaceutical, not a disposition that determines the legality of, directs, or orders a specific method of pregnancy termination. Therefore, the mere circumstance that the import of a pharmaceutical has been approved cannot lead to the conclusion that the disposition violated Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

In addition, Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 has merely functioned as a standard for exemption from punishment for abortion by excluding the application of abortion crimes under the Criminal Act pursuant to Article 28 of the same Act. It is difficult to view the provision itself as an independent prohibitive norm that actively bans 'pregnancy termination by methods other than surgery'. Moreover, since Article 269, Paragraph 1 (Self-Abortion) and Article 270, Paragraph 1 (Physician Abortion) of the Criminal Act—which fundamentally prohibited and punished pregnancy termination—were ruled Non-conformable to the Constitution on April 11,²⁾2019 and lost their effect on January 1, 2021, deriving an independent prohibitive effect that 'pregnancy termination outside the methods and grounds specified in the relevant law is prohibited' by a converse interpretation of the permissible grounds in Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 does not conform to the normative system. Furthermore, it creates a burdensome restriction without explicit statutory basis, which runs counter to the intent of the aforementioned Constitutional Non-conformity decision and is thus difficult to permit.

In addition, the purpose of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 is to contribute to the improvement of public health by protecting the life and health of mothers and infants (Article 1). If import item approval were prohibited even for pharmaceuticals whose safety and efficacy have been confirmed, rendering them unavailable to the general public, it would rather conflict with the legislative purpose of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 to protect the right to life and health of mothers. The main intent of the Constitutional Non-conformity decision regarding Article 269, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act, etc., lies in the principle that a woman's right to self-determination regarding whether to maintain pregnancy must not be excessively restricted, and the protection of fetal life must be harmoniously balanced with a woman's right to self-determination. In light of this intent, it is also necessary to consider when interpreting this case that if it is a pregnancy termination drug whose safety and efficacy have been confirmed, the import item approval itself should not be prohibited as a violation of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

On the other hand, there is an opinion that since the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 stipulates only surgery, other methods such as drugs are prohibited and their import item approval is also impermissible. However, Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 has existed since its enactment in 1973 and merely failed to reflect subsequent medical advancements and the diversification of pregnancy termination means; an intent to actively prohibit pregnancy termination drugs or their import item approval cannot be derived therefrom. In particular, under the current legal system where major parts of abortion crimes under the Criminal Act have lost their effect, it is also difficult to establish the normative premise to interpret Articles 14 and 28 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 as grounds for prohibiting methods other than surgery.

Furthermore, there may be an opinion that import item approval cannot be granted for pregnancy termination drugs under the current state where Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 remains in force while proposed amendments to the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 aimed at reorganizing provisions on artificial pregnancy termination (Footnote: Refer to the main contents of the Partial Amendment to the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 submitted by the government on Nov 18, 2020 under Bill No. 2105459) failed to be enacted into law. However, putting aside the point that the regulatory system regarding permissible gestational weeks, grounds, and procedures for pregnancy termination needs to be clearly reorganized through legislation, using current Article 14 of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」 as a ground to prohibit import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs itself simply because such legislative measures remain incomplete is not valid.

Therefore, in this case, import item approval for pregnancy termination drugs cannot be deemed a violation of the 「Mother and Child Health Act」.

In this case, the employer personally can serve as the safety and health manager.

First, Article 15(1) of the Act stipulates that an employer shall require a person who substantially oversees and manages a place of business to oversee and manage matters concerning safety and health at the place of business under each item of the same paragraph. Article 15(2) defines the person who oversees and manages the tasks specified in each item of Article 15(1) as the safety and health manager, requiring them to direct and supervise safety managers under Article 17 and health managers under Article 18.

However, Article 15(1) of the Act sets the qualification for a safety and health manager based solely on whether the person holds substantive authority to oversee and manage the place of business. It does not prohibit the employer from serving as the safety and health manager, nor does it mandate that a person other than the employer must be appointed. Therefore, when an employer directly oversees and manages a place of business, it is consistent with the statutory text for the employer personally to serve as the safety and health manager.

Furthermore, if the law were interpreted to require appointing someone other than the employer as the safety and health manager even when the employer directly oversees and manages the place of business, it would result in formally granting the status of safety and health manager to a person without actual authority over workplace safety and health matters. This would run counter to the purpose of the Act (Article 1), which aims to establish a safety and health management system centered on the person with substantive authority and responsibility to direct and supervise safety and health, while clarifying where responsibility lies.

In addition, a administrative fine is imposed for violations of Article 15(1) of the Act (Article 175(5)(1)). Interpreting that an employer cannot serve as the safety and health manager simply because the entity obligated to appoint one is the employer—even when that employer directly oversees and manages the place of business—overly expands provisions that serve as the basis for burdensome administrative measures in a manner unfavorable to the employer, which is unreasonable.

On the other hand, there is an opinion that an employer cannot serve as a safety and health manager because the employer and the safety and health manager are distinct legal entities. However, the safety and health manager system is not intended to formally confer a specific position, but to ensure that the person possessing substantive authority and responsibility to oversee and manage workplace safety and health performs that role. Considering that, unlike "safety managers" or "health managers" under Articles 17 and 18 of the Act, safety and health managers are not required to perform their duties on an exclusive basis, and that an employer who directly manages a place of business can make swift decisions and execute matters regarding costs, personnel, and facility improvements for safety and health while clarifying accountability, such an opinion is not sound.

Therefore, in this case, the employer personally can serve as the safety and health manager.

Factories, etc. exempt from installing sprinkler systems refer only to cases where both the roofs and exterior walls are made of non-combustible materials and both possess a fire-resistant structure.

First, Item 1(d) of Attached Table 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Fire Facility Act designates specific fire safety objects required to install sprinkler systems, and sub-item 10) specifies factories, etc. whose “roofs or exterior walls are not made of non-combustible materials or do not have a fire-resistant structure.” In terms of textual context, the word “or” between “roofs” and “exterior walls” signifies an alternative connection. Therefore, if either the roof or exterior wall meets the subsequent conditions, it should be considered subject to application. Similarly, the phrasing “are not made of non-combustible materials or do not have a fire-resistant structure” means that if either condition—being non-combustible or being fire-resistant—is not met, it is appropriate to consider the facility subject to the requirement.

Accordingly, if either the roof or exterior wall is not made of non-combustible materials, or if either the roof or exterior wall does not possess a fire-resistant structure, the facility must be regarded as subject to sprinkler system installation. By reverse interpretation, it conforms to the clear language of the text to conclude that only factories, etc. whose roofs and exterior walls are both made of non-combustible materials and simultaneously possess a fire-resistant structure are exempt from sprinkler system installation.

Furthermore, when the Enforcement Decree of the Fire Facility Act was partially amended by Presidential Decree No. 25444 on July 7, 2014, the standards were tightened to require sprinkler systems if the roofs or exterior walls of factories, etc. were not made of non-combustible materials or lacked a fire-resistant structure. This amendment aimed to resolve the issue of rapid fire spread and severe damage caused when roofs or exterior walls are not non-combustible or fire-resistant. Therefore, concluding that only factories, etc. whose roofs and exterior walls are both made of non-combustible materials and have a fire-resistant structure are exempt aligns with the legislative intent of the Decree.

In addition, considering the purpose of the Fire Facility Act (Article 1)—which aims to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of citizens and contribute to public safety and welfare—and the fact that the installation of fire-extinguishing equipment directly relates to protecting public safety and must be strictly interpreted, it is reasonable to hold that factories, etc. must be equipped with sprinkler systems if either the roof or exterior wall is not made of non-combustible materials (which do not burn easily during a fire) or does not possess a fire-resistant structure (which can withstand fire).

Therefore, factories, etc. exempt from installing sprinkler systems refer only to cases where both the roofs and exterior walls are made of non-combustible materials and both possess a fire-resistant structure.

In this Case, the retirement pay must be calculated by using ordinary wages as average wages pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act.

First, Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act stipulates the method of calculating average wages (Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1), while prescribing that if the amount calculated pursuant to Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 of the same Article is less than the ordinary wages of the relevant employee, such amount of ordinary wages shall be deemed his or her average wages (Paragraph 2). As such, Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the same Act is not a separate, independent provision but a provision that complements the concept of average wages in an inseparable relationship with Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 of the same Article. When calculating average wages, Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 1 of the same Article shall apply in principle, but if the calculated amount falls below ordinary wages, Paragraph 2 of the same Article shall apply, making the amount of ordinary wages the final average wages.

Therefore, unless the Retirement Benefit Act contains a separate provision excluding the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act, when calculating an employee's retirement pay pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Retirement Benefit Act, if the employee's average wages are less than his or her ordinary wages, the retirement pay must similarly be calculated by using the amount of ordinary wages as average wages pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act.

Furthermore, ordinary wages serve as the 'standard wage' for calculating various statutory allowances such as allowance for extended, night, and holiday work (Article 56), advance notice of dismissal allowance (Article 26), and annual paid leave allowance (Article 60) under the Labor Standards Act, functioning to guarantee the minimum level of average wages, which may fluctuate depending on actual working hours or work performance³⁾. Meanwhile, the purpose of the retirement pay system is to guarantee an employee's normal standard of living as before⁴⁾. If the average wages forming the basis for calculating retirement pay fail to reach even ordinary wages—the basis for calculating various statutory allowances—interpreting the law to allow adjustment so that retirement pay is calculated and paid based on ordinary wages aligns with the purpose of establishing the ordinary wage and retirement pay systems.

In addition, the Labor Standards Act aims to guarantee and improve the basic living standards of employees by setting standards for working conditions in accordance with the Constitution (Article 1), and the Retirement Benefit Act aims to contribute to guaranteeing a stable post-retirement life for employees by prescribing matters necessary for establishing and operating employee retirement benefit systems (Article 1). In light of the legislative purposes of these two statutes, receiving retirement pay less than the amount calculated on the basis of ordinary wages for an employee who provided contractual work does not accord with the legislative purpose of guaranteeing employees' basic living standards and stable post-retirement lives, which must also be considered when interpreting this Case.

Therefore, in this Case, the retirement pay must be calculated by using ordinary wages as average wages pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act.

In this Case, the consent of all co-owners for the land use must be obtained.

Article 57 (1) of the National Land Planning Act and Article 9 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act merely stipulate that to apply for a permit for development activities, one must submit "documents proving that the applicant is entitled to engage in development activities on the relevant land, such as ownership or right to use the land," to the authority granting permits for development activities, but do not provide whether consent of all co-owners or merely a majority of co-owners is required for land use when applying for a permit for development activities regarding co-owned land. Therefore, this Case shall follow the Civil Act, which is the general law regarding the management, disposition, and alteration of co-owned property.

However, Article 262 (1) of the Civil Act stipulates that when a thing is owned by several persons by shares, it shall belong to joint ownership (co-ownership), and Article 264 of the same Act stipulates that no co-owner may dispose of or alter the co-owned property without the consent of the other co-owners. Furthermore, the main sentence of Article 265 of the same Act stipulates that matters concerning the management of co-owned property shall be decided by a majority of shares of the co-owners. In this Case, the issue is whether the alteration of the form and quality of land intended for constructing a new building on co-owned land constitutes a disposition or alteration of co-owned property, or an act of management of co-owned property.

First, Article 9 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the National Land Planning Act requires a person who intends to engage in development activities to submit documents proving that the applicant is entitled to engage in development activities on the land, such as ownership or right to use the land, when applying for a permit for development activities. This is understood to mean that the applicant must submit documents to confirm whether they have secured a legal title to stably and lawfully carry out the planned development activities on the land¹⁾.

However, the alteration of the form and quality of land that requires a permit for development activities pursuant to Article 56 (1) 2 of the National Land Planning Act refers to construction work that changes the shape of the land into a building lot suitable for the new construction of a building²⁾. By altering the shape of the land through methods such as cutting, filling, leveling, or paving, it externally and effectively alters the form and quality of the land, placing it in a state that is difficult to restore to its original state³⁾. This goes beyond acts of management of co-owned property—such as determining specific methods for using and taking the profits from the co-owned property—and constitutes an act of 'disposition' or 'alteration' that causes a fundamental change to the existing state of the co-owned property⁴⁾. Therefore, in this Case, it must be deemed that the consent of all co-owners regarding the use of co-owned land is required.

Furthermore, Article 11 (11) 2 of the Building Act explicitly provides a special exception allowing a building permit to be granted without securing full ownership if consent is obtained from at least 80 percent of the co-owners of the co-owned building and land, and the sum of the shares of the consenting co-owners constitutes at least 80 percent of the total shares. On the other hand, considering that the National Land Planning Act and its subordinate statutes do not contain separate provisions regarding the ratio of co-owners whose consent must be obtained when applying for a permit for development activities on co-owned land, it is reasonable in this Case to strictly apply the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Act and interpret that the consent of all co-owners for land use is necessary.

In addition, if a permit for development activities is granted with the consent of only a portion of the co-owners, the possibility of legal disputes arising among the non-consenting co-owners after the permit is issued cannot be ruled out. Thus, to ensure the effectiveness and stability of administration, the need to strictly interpret the consent requirements for the use of co-owned land must also be considered when interpreting this Case.

Therefore, in this Case, the consent of all co-owners for the land use must be obtained.

The facilities allowed to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act include all facilities except for those specified in each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

First, Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act defines one of the facilities permitted to enter a knowledge industry center as "other facilities prescribed by Presidential Decree as facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies." The main text of the parts outside the individual subparagraphs of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, which is delegated by the statute, explicitly states that "facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Act shall be facilities excluding the facilities listed in the following subparagraphs." Therefore, under the literal text and regulatory structure of the Industrial Cluster Act and its decree, it is clear that any facility is deemed a facility for supporting the production activities of tenant companies as long as it is not excluded by the subparagraphs of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree. Since the regulation does not require a separate uation of whether a facility possesses the functional capacity to support the production activities of tenant companies, all facilities—excluding those listed in each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the same Decree—must be viewed as "facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies allowed to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Act."¹⁾

Generally, when a statute utilizes a delegation clause formatted as "...as facilities prescribed by Presidential Decree," it is intended to enable the upper statute to predict what contents will be determined by the lower decree.²⁾ When defining delegated matters in this manner within a lower decree, the provisions must satisfy the criteria of "...as facilities."³⁾ Consequently, facilities that are not excluded by each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Cluster Act should be considered to already satisfy the criteria for "facilities for supporting the production activities of tenant companies."⁴⁾

Furthermore, the former Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Cluster Act (prior to being amended by other laws under Presidential Decree No. 33366 on March 28, 2023, and enforced on the same day) used to exhaustively list the individual facilities intended to support the production activities of tenant companies in Article 36-4, Paragraph 2. However, through the amendment by other laws via Presidential Decree No. 33366 on March 28, 2023, the regulatory method was altered to list only the facilities prohibited from entering knowledge industry centers. This shift was intended to revitalize knowledge industry centers and enhance convenience for tenant companies by allowing most facilities to enter, with the exception of a few sectors such as agriculture, gambling, and housing supply businesses.⁵⁾ Therefore, when determining whether a facility is permitted to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act, interpreting the law to require an independent assessment of whether it supports production activities—in addition to verifying whether it is excluded by the subparagraphs of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree—would tighten regulations on eligible facilities without any special legal basis. This does not align with the purpose of the Industrial Cluster Act and its decree, which aims to expand the scope of eligible tenant companies.

Therefore, the facilities allowed to enter a knowledge industry center pursuant to Article 28-5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act include all facilities except for those specified in each subparagraph of Article 36-4, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

The scope of power generation projects subject to the consultation procedure pursuant to Article 7, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 5 of the "Electricity Utility Act" is limited to the projects specified in each subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.

First, Article 7, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 5 of the "Electricity Utility Act" mandates that for power generation businesses using solar, wind, or fuel cell energy under Article 2 of the Renewable Energy Act, "a public consultation procedure shall be conducted through prior notice as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Rather than directly prescribing the applicable scope and methods of the public consultation procedure, it delegates them to the Presidential Decree. This is intended to allow the Presidential Decree to specifically determine the targets and procedures requiring public consultation in consideration of practical suitability based on the type and scale of the power generation business. Therefore, if each subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" exhaustively lists the types, scope, and announcement deadlines of the projects, it is consistent with the literal text to interpret this as imposing the obligation of public consultation only on the relevant projects.

In particular, Article 4-2, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 2, Item (c) of the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" sets the announcement deadline for fuel cell power generation businesses under Article 2, Subparagraph 1, Item (b) of the Renewable Energy Act, while strictly limiting its scope only to power generation businesses with a generation capacity "exceeding 3,000 kilowatts." Selecting and regulating only cases that exceed a specific capacity based on generation capacity should be viewed as reflecting the legislative intent to allow projects falling short of that capacity to omit the public consultation procedure.

Furthermore, since the public consultation procedure has a regulatory nature that imposes a temporal and financial burden on those seeking a license for a power generation business, expanding the interpretation to apply the consultation procedure regulations even to projects that do not fall under any subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" is difficult to permit under the principle of the rule of law in administration. It is also unreasonable in that it could cause difficulties in project progression for operators due to unclear text regarding the timing and method of announcements.

In addition, looking at the legislative history of the regulations regarding public consultation on power generation businesses, when the "Enforcement Decree of the Electricity Utility Act" was partially amended by Presidential Decree No. 31066 on September 20, 2020, the scope of projects subject to public consultation was limited to 'projects above a certain level,' such as projects subject to environmental impact assessments, considering the degree of impact on residents' lives or the environment. It is necessary to consider when interpreting this case that the regulation was established with the intent not to apply the public consultation procedure to small-scale power generation businesses that do not fall into this category.¹⁾.

Therefore, the scope of power generation projects subject to the consultation procedure pursuant to Article 7, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 5 of the "Electricity Utility Act" is limited to the projects specified in each subparagraph of Article 4-2, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act.